



# Introduction to Quantum Computing

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INF554 - Lectures 8 & 9

## The genesis

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
### Copenhagen School (Bohr, Heisenberg, ...)

- The state of a quantum particle is only fixed after a measurement
- Bennett, Brassard'84: perfectly secure quantum encryption... that can be used in practice!



### Paradoxe of Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen'35

- Very distant particles remain linked!?
- Aspect, Grangier, Roger, Dalibard'82: yes!
- Quantum encryption of Ekert'91 can be certifiable




## Quantum boxes

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### Classical information is encoded using bit (0/1)

- The measure describes the state of the system
- A random bit is a 'hidden' bit




© Preskill

### Quantum information is encoded using quantum-bit

- Several possible measures
- Outcome is determined during the measurement



God does not play dice with the universe.



## Quantum key distribution

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### Problem

- Setting
  - No prior shared secret information between Alice and Bob
  - Authenticated classical channel
- Goal: Get a private key between Alice and Bob
- Application: One-time pad (Miller'1882-Shanon'1945)




Washington-Moscow hotline (1963)

### Classical results

- Impossible: all the information is in the canal
- Possible (using randomized techniques):
  - Amplify the privacy of an imperfect private key

Protocol: quantum part



Protocol: classical part

- **Reconciliation:** Alice and Bob publicly announce their coding choices  
A&B only keep key bits with same choices
- **Security:** Intercepting and opening a box → errors  
A&B check few key bits at random positions
- **Privacy amplification:** Perfect key using with few other more key bits

Conclusion

- Secrete key generation using an authenticated classical channel
- Small initial private key → large private key, with no authenticated channel


State

- 2-dimensional unit vector

$$|\psi\rangle = \cos \theta |0\rangle + \sin \theta |1\rangle$$


general case (complex amplitudes):

$$|\psi\rangle = \begin{pmatrix} \alpha \\ \beta \end{pmatrix} = \alpha|0\rangle + \beta|1\rangle, \quad |\alpha|^2 + |\beta|^2 = 1$$



Measure

- Randomized orthogonal projection



Evolution

- Unitary transformation  $G \in U(2)$  (⇒ reversible)

Definition:  $G \in \mathbb{C}^{2 \times 2}$  s.t.  $G^*G = Id$

$$|\psi\rangle \xrightarrow{G} |\psi'\rangle = G|\psi\rangle$$

$$|\psi'\rangle = G|\psi\rangle \xrightarrow{G^*} |\psi\rangle$$


Reversible classical transformation

- Identity

$$|b\rangle \xrightarrow{Id} |b\rangle$$

- Negation


$$|b\rangle \xrightarrow{NOT} |1-b\rangle$$



Hadamard transformation

- Definition: half-wave blade at 22,5°  $H = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 1 & -1 \end{pmatrix}$

$$|b\rangle \xrightarrow{H} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + (-1)^b|1\rangle)$$



- Properties: quantum coin flipping

$$|0\rangle \xrightarrow{H} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + |1\rangle) \xrightarrow{\text{Measure}} \begin{cases} \frac{1}{2} |0\rangle \\ \frac{1}{2} |1\rangle \end{cases}$$


$$|b\rangle \xrightarrow{H} |b\rangle \xrightarrow{H} |b\rangle \xrightarrow{\text{Measure}} |b\rangle$$

STOP Measure does not commute!

State

- Polarization: 2-dimensional vector


$$|\theta\rangle = \cos \theta |\rightarrow\rangle + \sin \theta |\uparrow\rangle$$



Measure

- Calcite crystal


separates horizontal and vertical polarizations



STOP A measure modifies the system

Transformation

- Well known transformation: half-wave blade  
orthogonal symmetry around its axis
- Any rotations (possibly with complex angles)



Implementation


- Explain how to realize the boxes of slide 3
- Implement the protocol of slide 4 using random bits, Hadamard transformations, and measurements

Analysis of a specific attack

- Assume a third party Eves intercepts a photon with probability 1/10, observes it, and forwards the projected photon to Bob
- Assume furthermore that Alice & Bob check each bit of their key with probability 1/10
- Compute
  - The probability Eve learns a bit of the secret key
  - The probability Eve is detected


Principle: 2 distant boxes which remain entangled

- Outcomes are random
  - but correlated if boxes are opened similarly
  - and uncorrelated otherwise



Bell'64 inequality

- Cooperative random game
  - Classical  $\leq 75\%$  of victory
  - Quantum  $> 85\%$  of victory
- Experimental verification at Orsay in 1982
- Application: quantum certification



Game

- Alice and Bob share random bits but cannot communicate
- Alice receives a random bit  $x$ , Bob  $y$
- Alice returns a bit  $a$ , Bob  $b$



- Goal: maximize  $p = \Pr_{x,y}(a \oplus b = x \wedge y)$

$\wedge$	0	1
0	0	0
1	0	1

$\oplus$	0	1
0	0	1
1	1	0

CHSH inequality [1969]

- The best probabilistic strategy achieves  $p=3/4$

Deterministic strategy

- Provide a deterministic strategy achieving  $p=3/4$
- Show that no deterministic strategy can achieve  $p=1$
- Conclude that  $p \leq 3/4$  for every deterministic strategies

Randomized strategy

- We assume that both players have access to a shared source of randomness, called  $\lambda$ 
  - Note: Physicists call  $\lambda$  a hidden variable
  - Justify why this is the most powerful model of random resource
- Let  $p_\lambda$  be the winning probability when  $\lambda$  is fixed
  - Show that there must be some  $\lambda$  such that  $p_\lambda \geq p$
- Conclude that the best probabilistic strategy achieves  $p=3/4$

State

- $|\psi\rangle \in \mathbb{C}^{\{0,1\}^n}$  such that  $\| |\psi\rangle \| = 1$

$$|\psi\rangle = \sum_{x \in \{0,1\}^n} \alpha_x |x\rangle \quad \text{with} \quad \sum_{x \in \{0,1\}^n} |\alpha_x|^2 = 1$$

- Examples
  - Separated 2-qubit:  $|00\rangle + |01\rangle = |0\rangle(|0\rangle + |1\rangle)$
  - Entangled 2-qubit:  $|00\rangle + |11\rangle \neq |\psi_1\rangle|\psi_2\rangle$  **EPR state**

Measure

- Randomized orthogonal projection

$$\sum_{x \in \{0,1\}^n} \alpha_x |x\rangle \xrightarrow{\text{Measure}} |\alpha_x|^2 \xrightarrow{\text{Measure}} |x\rangle$$

Evolution

- Unitary transformation  $G \in U(2^n)$  ( $G \in \mathbb{C}^{2^n \times 2^n}$  s.t.  $G^*G = Id$ )

$$|\psi\rangle \xrightarrow{G} |\psi'\rangle = G|\psi\rangle$$

Vector spaces

- $V, W$ : vector spaces
- $V \otimes W$  is the free vector space  $\text{Span} ( v \otimes w : v \in V, w \in W )$  with equivalence relations
  - $(v_1 + v_2) \otimes w = v_1 \otimes w + v_2 \otimes w$
  - $v \otimes (w_1 + w_2) = v \otimes w_1 + v \otimes w_2$
  - $(c \cdot v) \otimes w = v \otimes (c \cdot w) = c \cdot (v \otimes w)$

Linear maps

- $S: V \rightarrow X, T: W \rightarrow Y$  : linear maps
- $S \otimes T: V \otimes W \rightarrow X \otimes Y$  is the linear map satisfying
  - $S \otimes T (v \otimes w) = S(v) \otimes T(w)$
  - (and extended by linearity)

Applications

- Joint probability distributions on spaces  $V, W$ 
  - $\mathcal{D}(V \times W) = \mathcal{D}(V) \otimes \mathcal{D}(W) \neq \mathcal{D}(V) \times \mathcal{D}(W)$  (: product distributions)

Definition

$$\begin{aligned} \text{c-NOT}|0b\rangle &= |0b\rangle \\ \text{c-NOT}|1b\rangle &= |1\rangle|(1-b)\rangle \\ \text{c-NOT}|ab\rangle &= |a\rangle|a \oplus b\rangle \end{aligned} \quad \text{c-NOT} = \begin{pmatrix} 1000 \\ 0100 \\ 0001 \\ 0010 \end{pmatrix}$$

Representation



Bell basis change

$$\begin{aligned} |x\rangle &\xrightarrow{H} \\ |y\rangle &\xrightarrow{\text{NOT}} \end{aligned} \quad |\beta_{xy}\rangle \quad \begin{aligned} |\beta_{00}\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00\rangle + |11\rangle) \\ |\beta_{01}\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|01\rangle + |10\rangle) \\ |\beta_{10}\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00\rangle - |11\rangle) \\ |\beta_{11}\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|01\rangle - |10\rangle) \end{aligned}$$

Measure of first qubit

- Projectors  $P_0 = |00\rangle\langle 00| + |01\rangle\langle 01| = |0\rangle\langle 0| \otimes I_2$   
 $P_1 = |10\rangle\langle 10| + |11\rangle\langle 11| = |1\rangle\langle 1| \otimes I_2$   
 $P_0 \oplus P_1 = Id$

- Measure of first qubit

$$|\psi\rangle = a|00\rangle + b|01\rangle + c|10\rangle + d|11\rangle \xrightarrow{\text{Measure}} \begin{aligned} \frac{\|P_0|\psi\rangle\|^2}{\|P_0|\psi\rangle\|^2 + \|P_1|\psi\rangle\|^2} P_0|\psi\rangle &= |0\rangle \frac{a|0\rangle + b|1\rangle}{\sqrt{a^2 + b^2}} \\ \frac{\|P_1|\psi\rangle\|^2}{\|P_0|\psi\rangle\|^2 + \|P_1|\psi\rangle\|^2} P_1|\psi\rangle &= |1\rangle \frac{c|0\rangle + d|1\rangle}{\sqrt{c^2 + d^2}} \end{aligned}$$

Generalization

- Partial measure project to a subspace compatible with the observation
  - Probability = square norm of the projection
  - Outcome = renormalization of the projection

### Partial vs complete measurement

- Consider any two-qubit state, and measure its first qubit and then its second qubit
  - Compute the probability distribution of the outcome
- Conclude that observing the two qubits is equivalent to measuring each qubit individually in any order
  - Note: This can be generalized to any number of qubits

### Non-cloning


- Assume there is a unitary map  $U$  such that, for every qubit  $|\psi\rangle$ :
 
$$U(|\psi\rangle|0\rangle) = |\psi\rangle|\psi\rangle$$
- Compute  $U(|\psi\rangle|0\rangle)$  for  $|\psi\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + |1\rangle)$ 
  - using the definition of  $U$
  - using the linearity of  $U$  and then again the definition of  $U$
- Get a contradiction and conclude

### Reminder

- Goal: maximize  $p = \Pr(a \oplus b = x \wedge y)$

### Quantumly

- Alain and Bob share an EPR state



- Bob performs a rotation of angle  $\frac{\pi}{8}$
- If  $x = 1$ , Alice performs a rotation of angle  $\frac{\pi}{4}$
- If  $y = 1$ , Bob performs a rotation of angle  $-\frac{\pi}{4}$
- Alice et Bob observe their qubit and send their respective outcomes
- Theorem:  $p = \cos^2(\frac{\pi}{8}) \approx 0.85$

Realization: [Aspect-Grangier-Roger-Dalibard: Orsay'82]



### Entangles boxes

- Implement the entangled boxes of slide 10 using EPR states

### Properties


- Show that applying a unitary  $U$  on the first qubit of an EPR state is equivalent to applying the transposed matrix of  $U$  on its second qubit

### Quantum game


- Prove the theorem of previous slide

### Problem

- Alice & Bob share an EPR state:  $|\beta_{00}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00\rangle + |11\rangle)$
- Alice wants to send two bits  $xy$  to Bob
- But Alice can only send one qubit to Bob



### Bell basis change



$$\begin{aligned}
 |\beta_{00}\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00\rangle + |11\rangle) \\
 |\beta_{01}\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|01\rangle + |10\rangle) \\
 |\beta_{10}\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00\rangle - |11\rangle) \\
 |\beta_{11}\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|01\rangle - |10\rangle)
 \end{aligned}$$

### Protocol


- Alice applies to its qubit NOT, if  $y=1$ ; and FLIP, if  $x=1$   $FLIP = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 \end{pmatrix}$
- Alice sends its qubit to Bob
- Bob performs the inverse of the Bell basis change, and observes  $xy$

**Problem**

- Alice wants to transmit a qubit  $|\psi\rangle$  to Bob
- Bob: far and unknown position to Alice




**Realization**



The quantum communication does not reveal anything on  $|\psi\rangle$ !

**Circuit**



**Analysis**

- Final state  $\frac{1}{2} \sum_{x,y} |xy\rangle |\psi_{xy}\rangle$  with  $|\psi_{xy}\rangle = (\text{NOT})^y (\text{FLIP})^x |\psi\rangle$
- By measuring x,y, third qubit is projected to  $|\psi_{xy}\rangle$
- After learning x,y, Bob can correct  $|\psi_{xy}\rangle$  to  $|\psi\rangle$

**Realizations**

- 1 photon [Zeilinger et al : Innsbruck'97]
- 1 photon, 6 km [Gisin et al : Genève'02]
- 1 atom [Blatt et al : Innsbruck'04]
- Today: over 100km



**Problem**

- Alice and Bob are far away
- They want to flip a coin in a fair way but they don't trust each other



**Classically**

- Solutions based on harness assumptions of combinatorial problems
- No unconditionally secure solution

**Quantumly**

- There exists a protocol with maximal bias 0,25 [2001]
- There is no protocol with bias better than 0,207 [2002]
  - There exists a protocol with maximal bias 0,207 [2009]


**Weak version: election**

- Alice wants head
- Bob wants tail
- There exists a protocol with arbitrarily small bias [2007]



**Main idea**

- Assume Alice & Bob share an EPR state



- Alice & Bob observe their qubit and get bit  $a,b$

**Fact**

- $a=b$  with probability 1
- $a$  (resp.  $b$ ) is a uniform random bit

**Problems**

- Who create the EPR state?
- If Alice does, Bob needs to check that is an EPR state:
  - And for instance not  $|00\rangle \rightarrow a=b=0$  with probability 1
- In order to check the EPR state, Bob needs the 2 qubits
  - Then Alice needs to check that Bob gives back the correct qubit

## EPR based coin flipping

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### Protocol

- Initialization
  - Alice prepares 2 EPR states
  - Alice send the corresponding first qubits to Bob
- Selection
  - Bob select the EPR state that will be use for flipping
  - The other EPR state will be use for checking the honesty of Alice
  - Alice and Bob observe their respective qubit of the *flipping* EPR state
- Checking
  - Alice sends to Bob her qubit of the *checking* EPR state
  - Bob measures the checking EPR state
  - If the measure outcomes is correct, Bob accepts coin
  - Otherwise, Bob declares that Alice has cheated



$$\begin{array}{c} |00\rangle/\sqrt{2} \\ \downarrow \\ |11\rangle/\sqrt{2} \\ \downarrow \\ |00\rangle/\sqrt{2} \\ \downarrow \\ |11\rangle/\sqrt{2} \end{array}$$

### Theorem

- If both participant are honest, the outcome is a perfect random bit
- If one of the participants is dishonest, the maximal bias is  $1/4$

### Attacks

- Goal: increase the probability to get 0
- Bob's attack: measure its 2 qubits, and select the EPR pair giving 0 (if any)
- Alice's attack:  $\frac{|00\rangle|EPR\ state\rangle + |EPR\ state\rangle|00\rangle}{\sqrt{2}}$

## Google and NASA snap up quantum computer

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
D-Wave machine to work on artificial-intelligence problems.

Nicola Jones

16 May 2013

D-Wave, the small company that sells the world's only commercial quantum computer, has just bagged an impressive new customer: a collaboration between Google, NASA and the non-profit Universities Space Research Association.

The three organizations have joined forces to install a D-Wave Two, the computer company's latest model, in a facility launched by the collaboration — the Quantum Artificial Intelligence Lab at NASA's Ames Research Center in Moffett Field, California. The lab will explore areas such as machine learning — making computers sort and analyse data on the basis of previous experience. This is useful for functions such as language translation, image searches and voice-command recognition. "We actually think quantum machine learning may provide the most creative problem-solving process under the known laws of physics," says a blog post from Google describing the deal.



The D-Wave Two quantum computer has a 512-qubit processor (pictured) that can do some calculations thousands of times faster than conventional computers.

D-WAVE



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## NSA seeks to build quantum computer that could crack most types of encryption

By Steven Rich and Barton Gellman, Published: January 2 [E-mail the writers](#)

In room-size metal boxes secure against electromagnetic leaks, the National Security Agency is racing to build a computer that could break nearly every kind of encryption used to protect banking, medical, business and government records around the world.


According to documents provided by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, the effort to build "a cryptologically useful quantum computer" — a machine exponentially faster than classical computers — is part of a \$79.7 million research program titled "Penetrating Hard Targets." Much of the work is hosted under classified contracts at a [laboratory](#) in College Park, Md.

## Supercomputer

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### Feynman'81

- "Can quantum systems be probabilistically simulated by a classical computer? [...] the answer is certainly, No!"



### Deutsch'85

- Quantum Turing Machine
- Existence of a universal Turing Machine



### Simon, Shor'94

- Quantum algorithms with exponential speedup
- Quantum attack of public-key crypto-systems



**n-qubit**

- Superposition of all possible values
- $2^n$  possible values

**Parallel computation**

- In one step,  $2^n$  computations
- But only one outcome can be (randomly) observed!



**Strategy**

- Combine cleverly those values before measuring them...

4 bits can take  $2^4=16$  values


- 0000
- 0001
- 0010
- 0011
- 0100
- 0101
- 0110
- 0111
- 1000
- 1001
- 1010
- 1011
- 1100
- 1101
- 1110
- 1111

**Gates**

- A gate  $C$  is a function on at most 3 qubits
- Example: AND, OR, NOT, ...

**Circuit**

- A circuit is a sequence of gates  $C = C_L \dots C_2 C_1$
- The size of  $C$  is its number  $L$  of gates
- $C$  computes a function  $f$  if for all input  $x$ :  $C(x, 0^k) = (f(x), z)$



**Theorem**

- Any function can be computed by a circuit using only NOT, OR, AND gates

**Gates**  $U \in U(2^k)$ ,  $k = 1, 2, 3$


- A quantum gate is a unitary map that acts upon at most 3 qubits

**Tensor product of gates**



**Circuit**

- A quantum circuit is a sequence of gates (extended by  $\otimes Id$ )



**Theorem**

- Any unitary can be realized exactly by a circuit and approximated using only gates c-NOT and  $\sqrt{H}$

**Reversible circuit**

- A logical circuit is reversible if each gate is reversible
- A reversible circuit is also a quantum circuit (since it permutes logical states)

**Embedding**

$$f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$$

$$f_{\oplus} : \{0, 1\}^{n+m} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{n+m} \quad f_{\oplus}(x, y) = (x, y \oplus f(x))$$

where:  $0 \oplus 1 = 1 \oplus 0 = 1$      $0 \oplus 0 = 1 \oplus 1 = 0$   
 $u \oplus v = (u_1 \oplus v_1, u_2 \oplus v_2, \dots)$

**Theorem**

- If a function  $f$  can be computed by a logical circuit of size  $L$ , then  $f_{\oplus}$  can also be computed by a reversible circuit of size  $O(L)$

**Universality**

- The Toffoli gate (c-c-NOT) is universal for reversible computing
- $$T(a, b, c) = (a, b, c \oplus (a \wedge b))$$




Normal form

- Function:  $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$
- Circuit:  $U_f : |x\rangle|0\rangle \mapsto |x\rangle|f(x)\rangle$   
 $|x\rangle|y\rangle \mapsto |x\rangle|y \oplus f(x)\rangle$

Alternative form  $S_f$


- Boolean function:  $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$
- Circuit:



- Conclusion:  
 $U_f(|x\rangle \otimes |\psi\rangle) = S_f(|x\rangle) \otimes |\psi\rangle$

Deutsch-Jozsa problem

- Oracle input:  $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  a black-box function



such that  $f$  is either constant or balanced

- Output: 0 iff  $f$  is constant

Query complexity

- Deterministic:  $2^{n-1} + 1$
- Quantum: 1

Special case  $n=1$

- No restriction on  $f$
- Deterministic vs quantum: 2 queries vs 1 query


$x \mapsto f(x)$  can be nonreversible!

Reversible implementation of  $f$

$$\alpha|0\rangle + \beta|b\rangle \xrightarrow{S_f} (-1)^{f(b)}\alpha|0\rangle + (-1)^{f(1)}\beta|1\rangle$$


Hadamard gate: half-wave blade at 22,5°

$$|b\rangle \xrightarrow{H} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + (-1)^b|1\rangle)$$



Quantum circuit

$$|0\rangle \xrightarrow{H} \xrightarrow{S_f} \xrightarrow{H} \text{Measure} \rightarrow ?$$



Initialization:  $|0\rangle$

Parallelization:  $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + |1\rangle)$

Query to  $f$ :  $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}((-1)^{f(0)}|0\rangle + (-1)^{f(1)}|1\rangle)$


Interferences:  $\frac{1}{2}((-1)^{f(0)}(|0\rangle + |1\rangle) + (-1)^{f(1)}(|0\rangle - |1\rangle))$

Final state:  $\frac{1}{2}((-1)^{f(0)} + (-1)^{f(1)})|0\rangle + (-1)^{f(0)} - (-1)^{f(1)}|1\rangle$

Reversible implementation of  $f$

$$\sum_{x \in \{0,1\}^n} \alpha_x |x\rangle \xrightarrow{S_f} \sum_{x \in \{0,1\}^n} (-1)^{f(x)} \alpha_x |x\rangle$$


Quantum Fourier transform



$$QFT_n |x\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_y (-1)^{x \cdot y} |y\rangle$$

where  $x \cdot y = \sum_i x_i y_i \pmod 2$

Quantum circuit



Initialization:  $|00 \dots 0\rangle$

Parallelization:  $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{x \in \{0,1\}^n} |x\rangle$

Query to  $f$ :  $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{x \in \{0,1\}^n} (-1)^{f(x)} |x\rangle$

Interferences:  $\frac{1}{2^n} \sum_{x,y \in \{0,1\}^n} (-1)^{f(x)+x \cdot y} |y\rangle$

Final state:  $\left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{x \in \{0,1\}^n} (-1)^{f(x)} \right) |00 \dots 0\rangle + \sum_{y \neq 00 \dots 0} \alpha_y |y\rangle$


Problem

- Oracle input:  $f: \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  a black-box function such that  $f(x) = a \cdot x$  for some fixed  $a \in \{0, 1\}^n$
- Output:  $a$

Query complexity

- Randomized:  $n$   
Query  $f(0^{i-1}10^{n-i}) = a_i$ , for  $i=1,2,\dots,n$
- Quantum:  $1$

Quantum circuit



Initialization:

Parallelization:

Query to  $f$ :

Interferences:

Final state:

RSA Challenges

- <http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs>

Challenge Number	Prize (\$US)	Status	Submission Date	Submitter(s)
RSA-576	\$10,000	Factored	December 3, 2003	J. Franke et al.
RSA-640	\$20,000	Factored	November 2, 2005	F. Bahr et al.
RSA-704	\$30,000	Not Factored		
RSA-768	\$50,000	Not Factored		
RSA-896	\$75,000	Not Factored		
RSA-1024	\$100,000	Not Factored		
RSA-1536	\$150,000	Not Factored		
RSA-2048	\$200,000	Not Factored		

- RSA-640 (193 digits) :

```

310741824049004372135075003588856793003734602284272754572016194882320644051808150455634682967172328678243791627238
033415471073108501919548529007337724822783525742386454014691736602477652346609
=
1634733645809253848443133883865090859841783670033092312181110852389333100104508151212118167511579
x
1900871281664822113126851573935413975471896789968515493666638539088027103802104498957191261465571
    
```

- RSA Algorithm (allows private communication) security based on the difficulty of factoring

One-way functions

- Example: multiplication / factorization
- Bases of modern encryption (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman'77)

RSA challenges (1991-2007)

- RSA-100, \$1,000, 1991
- RSA-640, \$20,000, 2005

17 x 19 = ?  
667 = ? x ?

310741824049004372135075003588856  
793003734602284272754572016194882  
320644051808150455634682967172328  
678243791627283803341547107310850  
191954852900733772482278352574238  
6454014691736602477652346609  
= ? x ?

Classical reduction

- Factorization can be reduced to period finding (of some arithmetic function)



Shor'94

Quantum tool: Fourier Transform

- FT reveals the period of a signal
- FT is (very) fast on a quantum superposition

```

3107418240490043721350750035888567930037346022842727545720161948823206440518081504556346829671723
286782437916272838033415471073108501919548529007337724822783525742386454014691736602477652346609
=
1634733645809253848443133883865090859841783670033092312181110852389333100104508151212118167511579
x
1900871281664822113126851573935413975471896789968515493666638539088027103802104498957191261465571
    
```

Theorem [Simon-Shor'94]

- Finding the period of any function on an abelian group can be done in quantum time poly(log |G|)

Order finding

- Input: integers  $n$  and  $a$  such that  $\gcd(a,n)=1$
- Output: the smallest integer  $q \neq 0$  such that  $a^q = 1 \pmod n$
- Reduction to period finding: the period of  $x \rightarrow a^x \pmod n$  is  $q$

Factorization


- Input: integer  $n$
- Output: a nontrivial divisor of  $n$

Reduction: Factorization  $\leq_R$  Order finding

- Check that  $\gcd(a,n)=1$
- Compute the order  $q$  of  $a \pmod n$
- Restart if  $q$  is odd or  $a^{q/2} \neq -1 \pmod n$
- Otherwise  $(a^{q/2} - 1)(a^{q/2} + 1) = 0 \pmod n$
- Return  $\gcd(a^{q/2} \pm 1, n)$

**Problem**

- Oracle input:  $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  a black-box function



such that  $\exists s \neq 0^n : \forall x \neq y, f(x) = f(y) \iff y = x \oplus s$

- Output: the period  $s$

**Complexity**



- Randomly:  $2^{\Omega(n)}$  queries
- Quantumly:  $O(n)$  queries and time  $O(n^3)$

**Idea**

- Use a Fourier transformation:  $QFT_n|x\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_y (-1)^{x \cdot y} |y\rangle$

where  $x \cdot y = \sum_i x_i y_i \pmod 2$

- Realization of  $QFT_n$  using Hadamard gates:



**Initialization:**  $|0^n\rangle|0^n\rangle$

**Parallelization:**  $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_x |x\rangle|0^n\rangle$

**Query to  $f$ :**  $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_x |x\rangle|f(x)\rangle$

**Filter:**  $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|x\rangle + |x \oplus s\rangle) |f(x)\rangle$

**Interferences:** Partial measure: project to a subspace compatible with the observation  
Probability = square norm of the projection

Outcome = renormalization of the projection

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^{(n-1)/2}}} \sum_{y:s \cdot y=0} |y\rangle|f(x)\rangle$$

**Construction of a linear system**

- After  $n + k$  iterations:  $y^1, y^2, \dots, y^{n+k} \in s^\perp$
- $s \neq 0^n$  is solution of the linear system in  $t$ :

$$\begin{cases} y^1 \cdot t = 0 \\ y^2 \cdot t = 0 \\ \vdots \\ y^{n+k} \cdot t = 0 \end{cases} \iff \begin{cases} y_1^1 t_1 + y_2^1 t_2 + \dots + y_n^1 t_n = 0 \\ y_1^2 t_1 + y_2^2 t_2 + \dots + y_n^2 t_n = 0 \\ \vdots \\ y_1^{n+k} t_1 + y_2^{n+k} t_2 + \dots + y_n^{n+k} t_n = 0 \end{cases}$$


- The  $y^i$  are of rank  $n-1$  with proba  $\geq 1-1/2^{k+1}$
- System solutions:  $0^n$  and  $s$

**Complexity**

- Constructing the system:  $O(n)$  queries, time  $O(n^2)$
- Solving the system: no query, time  $O(n^3)$

**Period Finding( $G$ )**

- Oracle input: function  $f$  on  $G$  such that  $f$  is strictly periodic for some unknown  $H \leq G$ :  
 $f(x) = f(y) \iff y \in xH$



- Output: generator set for  $H$

**Examples**


- Simon Problem:  $G = (\mathbb{Z}_2)^n, H = \{0, s\}$
- Factorization:  $G = \mathbb{Z}, H = r\mathbb{Z}$
- Discrete logarithm:  $G = \mathbb{Z}^2, H = \{(rx, x) : x \in \mathbb{Z}\}$
- Pell's equations:  $G = \mathbb{R}$
- Graph Isomorphism:  $G = \mathcal{S}_n$

**Quantum polynomial time algorithms (in  $\log|G|$ )**


- Abelian groups  $G$ : QFT-based algorithm [1995]
- Normal period groups  $H$ : QFT-based algorithm [2000]
- Solvable groups  $G$  of constant exponent and constant length [2003]
- ...

Shift problem

- Dihedral group  $\mathbb{Z}_N \times \mathbb{Z}_2$ : sub-exponential time  $2^{O(\sqrt{\log N})}$  [2003]



Graph Isomorphism



A	B
a	1
b	6
c	8
d	3
e	5
f	2
g	4
h	7


- Instance of Period Finding on the symmetric group where we just know how to implement  $QFT$ ... [1997]

General case

- Polynomial number of queries to  $f$ , but exponential post-processing time [1999]

Grover problem

- Oracle input:  $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  such that  $\exists! x_0 : f(x_0) = 1$
- Output:  $x_0$
- Constraint:  $f$  is a black-box



Query complexity

- Randomized:  $\Theta(2^n)$
- Quantum:  $\Theta(\sqrt{2^n})$   
 $n = 2 \implies 1$  query

Implementation of  $f$

$$\sum_x \alpha_x |x\rangle \xrightarrow{S_f} \sum_x (-1)^{f(x)} \alpha_x |x\rangle = \sum_x \alpha_x |x\rangle - 2\alpha_{x_0} |x_0\rangle$$


Double Hadamard gate

$$|x_1\rangle \xrightarrow{H} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + (-1)^{x_1}|1\rangle)$$

$$|x_2\rangle \xrightarrow{H} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + (-1)^{x_2}|1\rangle)$$

$$|x\rangle = |x_1 x_2\rangle \xrightarrow{H} \frac{1}{2} \sum_y (-1)^{x \cdot y} |y\rangle$$

with  $x \cdot y = x_1 y_1 + x_2 y_2 \pmod 2$



Initialization:  $|00\rangle$

Parallelization:  $\frac{1}{2}(|00\rangle + |01\rangle + |10\rangle + |11\rangle)$

Query to  $f$ :  $\frac{1}{2} \sum_x |x\rangle - |x_0\rangle$

Interferences:  $|00\rangle - \frac{1}{2} \sum_y (-1)^{x_0 \cdot y} |y\rangle$

Query to  $\delta_0$ :  $-|00\rangle - \frac{1}{2} (\sum_y (-1)^{x_0 \cdot y} |y\rangle - 2|00\rangle) = -H \otimes H |x_0\rangle$

Final state:  $-|x_0\rangle$

Grover operator

$$G \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} S_f H S_{\delta_0} H$$

$\text{Vect}_{\mathbb{R}}(|x_0\rangle, |\text{unif}\rangle)$


$$S_f = -S_{|x_0\rangle} = S_{|x_0\rangle^\perp}$$

$$-S_{\delta_0} = S_{|00\rangle}$$

$$H^{\otimes 2} S_{|00\rangle} H^{\otimes 2} = S_{|\text{unif}\rangle}$$

$$G = S_{|\text{unif}\rangle} S_{|x_0\rangle^\perp} = R_{2\theta}$$

with  $\sin \theta = \langle \text{unif} | x_0 \rangle = \frac{1}{2}$



After 1 iteration

$$|\text{unif}\rangle \mapsto -G|\text{unif}\rangle = -|x_0\rangle$$

Grover operator

$$G \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} S_f H S_{\delta_0} H$$

$\text{Vect}_{\mathbb{R}}(|x_0\rangle, |\text{unif}\rangle)$


$$S_f = -S_{|x_0\rangle} = S_{|x_0\rangle^\perp}$$

$$-S_{\delta_0} = S_{|00\rangle}$$

$$H^{\otimes 2} S_{|00\rangle} H^{\otimes 2} = S_{|\text{unif}\rangle}$$

$$G = S_{|\text{unif}\rangle} S_{|x_0\rangle^\perp} = R_{2\theta}$$

with  $\sin \theta = \langle \text{unif} | x_0 \rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}$



After  $T = 2/\pi \cdot \sqrt{2^n}$  iterations

$$|\text{unif}\rangle \mapsto -G^T |\text{unif}\rangle \approx -|x_0\rangle$$

Unstructured problems

- Grover algorithm [1996]

Algebraic problems

- Simon-Shor algorithm [1994]

Well structured problems

- Classical algorithms are optimal!

Problems with few structures

- Quantum walk based algorithms [2003]  
quantum analogy of random walks
- Examples
  - Element Distinctness, Commutativity:  $N^{2/3}$  [2004]
  - Triangle Finding:  $N^{9/7}$  (lower bound  $N$ ) [2013]
  - Square Finding:  $N^{1.25}$  (lower bound  $N$ ) [2010]
  - Matrix Multiplication:  $N^{5/3}$  (lower bound  $N^{3/2}$ ) [2006]
  - AND-OR Tree evaluation:  $\sqrt{N}$  [2007]


An Introduction to Quantum Computing

- Authors: Phillip Kaye, Raymond Laflamme, Michele Mosca
- Editor: Oxford University Press




Quantum Computation and Quantum Information

- Authors: Michael A. Nielsen, Isaac L. Chuang
- Editor: Cambridge University Press



Classical and Quantum Computation

- Authors: A. Yu. Kitaev, A. H. Shen, M. N. Vyalıy
- Editor: American Mathematical Society
- Collection: Graduate Studies in Mathematics



Lecture Notes for Quantum Computation


- Author: John Preskill
- Website: <http://www.theory.caltech.edu/~preskill/ph229/>

Quantum proofs for classical theorems

- Author: Andrew Drucker, Ronald de Wolf
- Website: <http://arxiv.org/abs/0910.3376>

Entanglement?

- "Classical entanglement" exists: shared randomness
- But quantum entanglement is "stronger"  
Bell-CHSH inequality and applications



Complex amplitudes?


- No: they can be simulated using only real amplitude

Negative amplitudes?

- Yes: they can induce destructive interferences

Hardness of amplitudes?

- No: amplitudes must be easily computable for being physically realizable



Applications

- Unfalsifiable money, artificial intelligence, ...

Quantum computing


- For a better understanding of quantum phenomenon
- New mathematical tool for proving results in classical computing!

Technology

- Computer, intermediate models: boson sampling
- Certification : encryption, random generator, computation

Welcome

The Paris Centre for Quantum Computing (PCQC) in Paris, France, brings together computer scientists, theoretical & experimental physicists and mathematicians that work in and around Paris. Our goal is to develop novel quantum information and communication technologies and lead the way from a Personal Computer (PC) to a Quantum Computer (QC).



Learn more about PCQC

Highlights

**PCQC is official!**  
PCQC was inaugurated in January 1st, 2014 as a *Federation de Recherche FR3640* between CNRS, Univ Paris Diderot and Telecom ParisTech. The centre has 17 permanent members from the above institutions, as well as from INRIA Paris, Univ Pierre & Marie Curie, CEA, Univ Paris-Sud and Institut d'Optique.

**QCRYPT 2014 in Paris**  
The 4th international Quantum Cryptography QCRYPT conference will be organised in Paris in September 2014.

More news

Openings

PCQC is welcoming applications for a number of PhD and postdoc positions.

In addition, every year, the different French institutions (eg. CNRS, INRIA, Universities) have permanent job openings in Computer Science and in Physics, including quantum information. The application deadline is usually in early January. We recommend interested parties to contact a PCQC member at least two months before the deadline in order to discuss the possibilities and the different application processes.

Learn more about Openings

Events

The PCQC members are organising regularly seminars, workshops, schools or conferences. You can find more information about upcoming and past events [here](#). You can also join our mailing list

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